

PARTICULARITIES ON MODIFICATION OF THE MILITARY POWER BALANCE IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN SPACE

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Abstract: Taking into account the changes in the balance of military power in the Russian-Ukrainian space, promoted by state actors with nuclear capabilities (Iran, North Korea, and Russia), the Alliance reaffirms its commitment to work in tandem with international humanitarian law and moves towards the gradual development of defense programs against hybrid threats, international terrorism, the promotion of the cyber war and the extension of the nuclear program to the East European area. In this article we will detail the particularities of the change of the military power balance in the Russian-Ukrainian area as a result of the Russian Federation's territorial expansion and energy blackmail policy addressed to the European countries, as well as NATO's position on the flagrant violations and the imperialist, undemocratic attitude of the Russian federal leadership.

Keywords: military power, military power projection, power factors, military potential, power balance, military power instruments, fighting capacity, Russian-Ukrainian space, missile shield

1. CONCEPTUAL MILESTONES ON MILITARY POWER AND MILITARY POWER PROJECTION

In the evolution of geopolitical events, *power* is important. The concept of *power* is particularly complex and represents the ability of some actors to produce, construct or destroy various goods of particular or general interest, and "*great power is a state capable, under certain circumstances, to alter the will of individuals or groups, through effective use of force, going up to war*"[1]. From a sociological point of view (if we refer to social processes and situations), power means "*someone's ability to impose their will in social relationships despite any resistance encountered and regardless of the factors that determine this capacity*"[2]. It manifests itself through authority and force, and those who hold power can maintain it by legitimacy or coercion.

As an extremely complex phenomenon, power has its own *features* that regulate social relations, establish and rank the power centers, establish relations between the subjects (who leads and who executes) on the basis of *global power factors* (political, military, economic, technological, communication, etc.). All these elements are criteria that have highlighted the types of power (niche, secondary, regional and global), the struggle for power remaining the essence of the institutional policy by which "*states aim at reaching their own interests using the instruments of the military power*"[3], in order to maintain superiority and hegemony in areas of strategic interest.

Military power is a special form of power, based on the state's armed respond capacity. It is based on actionable vectors (armed forces, military potential and military reputation) and military-specific regulations.

The legitimacy of the military power (*the only and true determinant of the power of a state*)[4] provides the basis for the possibility of recourse to the military force by using instruments of the coercive dimension of political power. According to other sources, "*military power is the military's ability to act by its military potential*"[5] (personnel, budget, infrastructure, logistics, armaments, research-development institutions, defense industry, etc.) in order to achieve its strategic objectives, to ensure the security of allies and national interests.

The configuration of the military power system must be stable and based on the following elements of support: Armed forces, quality and diversity of infrastructure elements; The quality of the command act, the size and structure of the budget allocated to the defense, the level of training; The contribution of military technology and intelligence, the cohesion and morale of troops, the level of spiritual and material satisfaction of staff [6], etc. The quality of these system elements influences the capacity of any state to use its military potential, in relation to its national interests and defense policy.

The projection of military power is an important component of the projection of power, which includes a complex of diplomatic, political, financial, economic and military activities organized to exert influence within a system of relations as an expression of the mode of imposing the sovereign will, a last alternative usable when most of the power elements failed or failed to deliver the expected results. Both the projection of power and the projection of force have become very complex areas because they bring to the foreground states and international organizations (governmental or non-governmental), and the decision-making process on issues or events of major interest is always collective. Concluding on the two concepts (military power projection and force projection), we believe that the first concept belongs to the strategic environment, and the second concept belongs to the tactical or operational environment.

The projection of components of military power (belonging to an alliance, coalition, or state) can be made according to the interests, needs, possibilities and resources available to exert influence in an area of strategic interest, by imposing the act of will on defusing crises, eradicating conflicts, creating a climate of stability and security, all of which are associated with historical motivation, tradition, strategic vision, image, morality, etc. From this perspective, the projection of military power can be influenced by the following factors: International regulations; Political will; The model established by international diplomacy; Collective motivation; Strategic vision; Competitive Intelligence; Purposes, finalities, and objectives; Armed forces; Economic and financial support; The degree of air, land and sea space control; Post-conflict strategy, etc. All these factors are indispensable for the planning of military power design, but the degree of complexity of these factors justifies the cause for which, at the beginning of this century, no important international or national actor has managed to unilaterally design its military power in area of strategic interest.

In the contemporary operational environment, the projection of military power or force (at strategic or tactical-operative level) as a form of global power projection depends, in our opinion, on the following characteristics: International credibility; Major purposes of stabilizing conflict zones; Comprehensive analysis of situations; Preventive character; Flexibility of forces; Operative capacity to intervene in military, humanitarian and civil emergencies; Persuasive character; Preventive and active intelligence; Multilateral logistics capacity; High ability to execute preventive strikes, etc. In view of these characteristics, we appreciate that each type of operation implies a specific way of designing force, not being confused with an aggression of the past, but with a credible and operative tool to defuse conflicts, crises, or achieve stability and security at global and regional level.

In conclusion, military power influences the behavior of processes and phenomena in the operational environment, may impose certain options on partners, certain institutionalized cooperation relations, willingly or necessarily accepted. New elements such as: network warfare, expeditionary forces, super specialized means, information supremacy and technological advantage have already been of major importance in the characterization of the military power system of this 21st century.

2. ATTITUDES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION THAT HAVE LED TO THE DESTABILIZATION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATO'S POSITION ON ALLEVIATING THE SITUATION IN THE AREA

For nearly twenty years, Russia's energy blackmail and military activities have affected security and stability in the Russian-Ukrainian operational environment, have changed the operational environment, and have increased the state of unpredictability. While NATO member states have honored their international commitments, the Russian Federation has violated the values, commitments, and principles that grounded the NATO-Russia relationship, disregarded most of the principles that underpinned the Euro-Atlantic global security architecture and deceived trust on which cooperation between the two sides was built.

Russia continued to strengthen its military presence in the eastern part of Europe, intensify its military activities, displace new structures of forces with high-performance capabilities, seriously destabilizing the balance of regional power, especially at the border with Ukraine. These developments have amplified hybrid risks and threats in the area, favored the rise of unpredictability, and the Alliance's response is to continue closely monitoring the situation in the region and to continue working on the situation and developing common approaches of European states to hostile challenges Russia, in a continuous evolution.

Destabilizing policies and targeted actions by Russia to change the balance of power in Eastern Europe included: The illegitimate and illegal annexation of the Crimea (which NATO member states will never recognize); The use of force to violate the borders of Eastern European sovereign states; Aggression and deliberate destabilization of the eastern part of the state of Ukraine; Numerous and unexpected exercises (as opposed to the provisions of the Vienna documents) and provocative military actions at the borders of NATO states, including continental waters of the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea; Enhancing hybrid threats in aggressive and irresponsible ways (of nuclear, bacteriological, and informational type), as well as The frequent violations of the airspace of some Alliance countries. Moreover, the significant military presence in the Black Sea, the intervention of the Russian Army and the military support of the Syrian regime, as well as the projection of military power in the Eastern Mediterranean, pose asymmetric risks and additional challenges to allied security.

NATO has responded to the measures taken by Russia to modify the Eastern European security environment by strengthening the Eastern European defense alignment (including the construction of the East European missile shield), by intensifying the ground forces exercises and maneuvers, and by stopping the whole military and civilian cooperation between Russia and NATO, remaining open to political dialogue with Russia. In fact, talks with Russia have been permanently agreed by NATO, which has very explicitly stated its position on the Russian hybrid war in the region of Ukraine. NATO will also remain open to regular dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, in order to avoid misunderstandings, involuntary escalations, miscalculation and to increase predictability and transparency, and to reduce gaps that do not facilitate military transparency.

The Alliance will not seek confrontation and will not be a direct threat to the Russian Federation, but it will not allow any deviation from the Alliance's established principles, being firm, predictable and transparent, as set out at the 2014 Wales Summit, which means the continuation of strategic talks with Russia on the basis of respect, in line with international commitments and legislation. Continuing NATO's relations with Russia and returning to normality will depend on a clear and constructive change in Russia's position on respect for international law, obligations and responsibilities.

NATO strongly condemned the Russian Federation's aggressive hybrid actions against the Ukrainian state and continued non-compliance with international rights and obligations, with Russia bearing full responsibility for the serious deterioration of the Crimean peninsula, especially for discrimination against the Tatar population and other local communities. To regulate these issues, NATO calls on the Russian authorities to take firm measures to ensure the freedoms and rights of the people living in the peninsula, and to respect international structures that monitor and support essential human rights protection activities in the conflict zone. NATO also condemns the excessive militarization of the peninsula and the increase of Russian military devices in the Black Sea region.

The Russian Federation, signing the Minsk Agreements, has a major responsibility for the situation in the area. However, Russia persists in its actions of destabilizing the eastern part of Ukraine, with repeated violations of international law. Moreover, Russia continued to provide equipment and weapons to the rebels, to provide financial assistance and to intervene militarily in conflict. To alleviate the situation in the Eastern Ukraine region, NATO calls on the Russian authorities to stop aggressive actions, use its influence on rebels to meet commitments, fire stop, disarmament and confidence-building measures.

An independent, sovereign and stable Ukrainian state, firmly committed to the rule of law and democracy, will be the key to Euro-Atlantic security. Moreover, the Alliance will remain firm in providing Ukraine with support to restore its sovereign status within its internationally recognized borders, as well as its right to take decision on its future and the way forward on its foreign policy, without external interference, as set out in Warsaw (30 September 2016), in the Final Act of the NATO Summit.

NATO has supported any peaceful solution to stop the conflict (through which more than 10,000 lives have been lost), to reintegrate areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions controlled by the Russia-backed rebel fighters. For this, Minsk agreements must be implemented, starting with the cease-fire agreement and ending with the unilateral withdrawal of armaments. NATO also strongly supported the OSCE's monitoring mission, although Russia-backed rebels are obstructing monitoring, violating the provisions of the Minsk Accords. Also in those areas, the EU-supported consultative mission is being assisted, assisting the Ukrainian state in implementing reforms in the civil, police, police, and rule of law sectors.

In order to balance the security balance, the Black Sea countries have undergone important regional efforts, strengthened dialogue and cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova, supported their territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, continued to uphold the democratic right of partners to fight for sovereign and independent choices, to promote their own foreign or domestic policy without external constraints or pressures. Also based on the principles and international norms of law, the Final Act issued in Helsinki and the UN Charter, they continued to support the efforts to peacefully resolve conflicts in the South Caucasus and those of the Republic Moldova and Transnistria.

Moreover, as part of the overall democratic dialogue promoted by the Alliance with regard to ensuring the security of NATO populations and territories, the package of deterrence measures has been accompanied by an open dialogue and a strong commitment to Russia to reduce risks and increase transparency mutual. These efforts, to ensure a territorial balance, will be made at the same time as taking credible deterrent and defense measures.

On the territory of the south-eastern part of Europe, the Alliance will adopt an advanced presence with appropriate measures adapted to the Black Sea shore, by promoting Romania's deployment initiative in the area of a multinational tactical unity framework that will ensure integrated training of Allied units in the South-East Multinational Division. Thus, through these decisions, the Alliance will step up defensive deterrent measures, better know Russia's intentions in the Black Sea basin, show NATO's intention to operate in the area without constraints, provide a signal of regional security support, and an assessment of the options for a future enhanced presence in the Black Sea air and maritime environment.

In the spirit of meeting collective defense tasks, the NATO Summit in Lisbon (2010) decided to develop a NATO ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to fully cover and protect the European Union population, territory and forces against threats stemming from the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Eastern European operational environment. This plan is based on the principles of NATO's solidarity and the indivisibility of Allies security, reasonable challenge, fair distribution of tasks and risks, with increasing threats, availability and technical feasibility. If international efforts diminish the possibilities of proliferation and use of ballistic missiles, then NATO's missile-defense capabilities will adapt accordingly.

NATO's missile defense shield implementation program has had a rapid evolution, these achievements being made public at the Chicago Summit (2012), the Wales Summit (2014) and the Warsaw Summit (2016). Thus, the alignment of the anti-missile ballistic shield was implemented with technical and informational elements through the advanced deployment of Aegis ships with BMD capabilities at Rota (Spain), Aegis Ashore Complex from Deveselu (Romania), advanced remote detection radar of BMD deployed at Kürecik (Turkey) and Aegis Ashore Complex which will be deployed at the military base at Redzikowo (Poland). The allied states involved in this program understood the importance of implementing the ballistic shield and provided important voluntary, additional national contributions.

The US missile defense system (the Shield) is not aimed at Russian objectives and has no missions to undermine the strategic deterrent capabilities of Russian territory. Therefore, any offensive statement that threatens allied states because of the US missile defense shield is considered unacceptable, leaving NATO open to talks with Russia on this issue. However, the Russian cyber-attacks, as well as the nuclear/ballistic threats from North Korea and Iran, remain clear challenges to the security of NATO states. In Warsaw, the Alliance reaffirmed NATO's defensive attitude and admitted that cyberspace has become an operational environment in which the Alliance must organize defense as professionally as in the air, at sea or on the ground. This will enhance NATO's ability to deploy operations in cyberspace and provide an opportunity for efficient resource management and operational capabilities.

3. CONCLUSIONS

* The diversity of hybrid threats (international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, authoritarian regimes, unresolved conflicts, "failed states", global crime, internal corruption, uncontrolled migration, etc.), in consensus with the issues and the physiognomy of hybrid conflicts (information, bacteriological and nuclear warfare, guerrilla warfare, ethnic disputes, counterinsurgency, low intensity conflicts, etc.) have led to real changes in the organization and operation of the structure of forces, the projection of military power (or forces), the mission planning in the operational environment, as well as the use of performing technologies, whose dynamics have produced essential mutations on the entire military system;

* A new consequence of technological development will be the expansion of the conflict in the cosmic space and in the information environment, the East European world moving from the three-dimensional (terrestrial, air and maritime) space to the five-dimensional conflict space. This new perspective will cause the actors (manufacturers and suppliers) to compete in increasingly sophisticated and costly weaponry and equipment systems.

This issue will attract many specialists, will concern international security actors as the future evolution of this process will be upward and of a global scale;

* Under the unprecedented expansion of the operational confrontational environment, the aerospace component of the military power favored the rapid multiplication of the space military actors, thus becoming an important factor of the future hybrid conflict, the new military equipment and technologies being an amplifying factor for the consolidation of an credible military power, capable of counteracting hybrid threats to the security of democratic states;

* The rapid operation of the 21st century will have a wider sphere than the classic contemporary defense/offensive operation. It will involve a complex system of actions because no country with a strong military potential will allow itself to permanently maintain at peace an army with complete structures ready for war, because they are inefficient and very expensive. Today, states are making efforts to operationalize military structures that, in a very short time, are able to reach war structures and capabilities. Many countries have deployed rapid action forces (reaction, intervention), the value of operative or tactical units, able to rapidly plan and conduct either peacekeeping or war operations;

* The modern battlefield, as a three-dimensional space of confrontation between the belligerents, recorded a rapid evolution, determined by the development of theories and general concepts of warfare. The essential parameters of the theater of operations will be determined by human and technological factors, as technological superiority will be necessary, but not always sufficient to achieve success, which will require a permanent analysis of the doctrinal-human-technical relationship. Moreover, the concepts of automated warfare, cyber-battlefield and digitized battlefield will decisively influence the operations of the forces, creating new dimensions of the battle space;

* At the current historical moment, the Russian Federation should continue its good strategic partnership relations with the EU and the US, develop proper relations with other European states (not energy blackmail), fight for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking of strategic materials (nuclear, radioactive, chemical, bacteriological, etc.), and manifest itself globally as a basic pillar of the fight against international terrorism, but neither as a force of violent political pressure as an instrument of the underworld and mafia clans, nor as the leader of non-compliance with international agreements on state borders.

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