

THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL SUPPORT CONDITIONS ON MULTINATIONAL INTERRELATIONATION AND INTEROPERABILITY IN NATO COALITION

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Abstract: *National cultural differences have created obstacles to successful alliance command and control. Distributed decision-making with many operational characteristics makes those challenges even more complicated. If we have to work effectively in coalition operations, we must understand the complexity of national cultural differences.*

Keywords: *operations, interoperability, command and control, NATO*

1. A BRIEF LOOK INTO A NATO OPERATION

Operation Sea Shield represents NATO's contribution to the international effort to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Somali pirates were put on the global security agenda in late 2008. More than 100 merchant ships have been attacked this year, and many have been hijacked and redeemed. For NATO and other international actors, this wave of maritime crime is seen as a threat to international peace and security because of its clear and likely implications for supply chain security, energy security, pirate-terrorist collusion, and more. Since 2007, Somali pirates operating in the waters of the Horn of Africa have attacked more than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages. Some U.S.-flagged ships were affected. As Somalia lacks an effective government to suppress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) in December 2008 developed the Interagency to Combat Piracy in the Horn of Africa: Partnerships and Action Plan. And work with international and industry partners to prosecute piracy in the Horn of Africa.

The operation was approved by the North Atlantic Council on August 17, 2009, as an evolution of the previous Allied Protector Operation (March to August 2009), and its purpose is to promote the safety of commercial sea routes and international navigation. In the area and help reduce the overall success rate of pirate attacks. In response to new piracy tactics, NATO has established greater synergy with other initiatives and international organizations, recognizing the continued need for regional capacity building within the scope of means and capabilities, and focusing on its support to maintain acceptable security.

Operation Ocean Shield is run by the NATO Maritime Command headquarters in Northwood, England. All allies contribute directly or indirectly to the mission through NATO's command structure and common funding. The NATO allies provide ships and maritime patrol aircraft to the NATO Permanent Maritime Group and takes turns assigning ships to the Shield of the Seas. On average, at any point in time, three to five NATO ships are part of the Shield of the Seas.

NATO's anti-piracy operations have also been supported by NATO partners. Both Ukraine and New Zealand provided ships and/or patrol aircraft. NATO hopes to welcome other non-NATO partners in the near future. Ocean Shield works closely with other naval forces in the region, including naval forces from the European Union's anti-piracy missions, the United States-led 151 Joint Task Force, and the National Navy. NATO also conducted anti-piracy training with the Japanese and Chinese navies.

By 2012, the number of attacks had suddenly dropped to a five-year low (see Figure 1). Better coordination of naval patrols improved best management practices for merchant ships, increased use of armed guards on board, and political developments in Somalia have all been praised for turning the tide of piracy.




FIG. 1 Somali Pirate Attacks: 2005-2012

Over time, the operation has evolved to respond to new pirate tactics: for example, the March 2012 strategic assessment emphasized the need to weaken pirates' logistics and support bases, including the prohibition of pirate ships or boats, and additional tracking beacon mother ships, and allow the use of force to destroy or destroy ships suspected of pirates or armed robbers. Through "Operation Ocean Shield", the alliance has also expanded its methods of combating piracy, providing assistance within its capacity to requesting regional countries to help them develop their own anti-piracy capabilities. In short, NATO's role is to prevent and stop piracy by providing naval escort and deterrence, through direct actions against piracy, and to strengthen cooperation with other anti-piracy operations in the region to optimize efforts and respond to changing piracy trends and tactics.

2. THE INFLUENCE OF DENMARK NATIONAL SUPORT FOR THE OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD

As part of an international effort, Denmark has contributed to peace and stability in Somalia, which combines political, military, and humanitarian efforts, as well as development policy efforts in Somalia and the entire region. This work is carried out bilaterally and within the framework of the United Nations and the European Union and works closely with the African Union (AU) and the East African Intergovernmental Development Authority (IGAD).

The overall goal of Denmark's anti-piracy activities is to make the waters of the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean safe and convenient for Danish and international maritime navigation. For a long time, Denmark has been making great military, political, legal, and financial contributions to the international community to combat piracy along the coast of the Horn of Africa.

With this strategy, Denmark's comprehensive anti-piracy work will be integrated into a single political framework, aimed at enhancing coordination, consistency, and coherence between many aspects of Danish efforts. The strategy considers Denmark's contribution to combating piracy within a time frame that can be extended to the end of 2014.

The Strategy focuses on three objectives:

- ❖ Combat piracy.
- ❖ Protect Danish and international shipping.
- ❖ Building capacity in the region will enable the affected countries to deal with the challenges of piracy in the long term.

Consistent with the widespread international attention it has received, combating piracy in the Western Indian Ocean has quickly become Denmark's diplomatic and security priority. This section discusses the main driving factors behind Denmark's strong participation. The driving factors are divided into three categories: protecting economic interests, using existing naval capabilities, and promoting multilateralism.

The Danish merchant fleet accounts for 10% of international shipping. Denmark has important economic interests in the global maritime industry, so it quickly realized the urgency of protecting international waters from piracy. An important part of the original Danish engagement story began on June 1, 2007, when the Danish cargo ship MV Danica White was hijacked. This incident stimulated the Danish public's early awareness of the problem of piracy in Somalia. It created a situation in which politicians felt pressure from the historically powerful Danish shipping industry and required them to invest national resources to find a substantive solution to the problem. The Danish maritime industry is very active in communicating to politicians and the public that protecting Danish trade interests is the key reason for military participation in the Horn of Africa.

In terms of resources, any country must prioritize when and where to deploy troops abroad. This is especially true for a small country like Denmark with relatively limited total resources. The Royal Danish Navy also has this view to financial resources, prioritization is limited to technical resources-existing strengths and capabilities. After years of Danish military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the army and air force have played an important role in it. Anti-piracy has provided the navy with an opportunity to demonstrate its expertise. As a naval commander who has been involved in Somali piracy since 2006, said in an interview: "We had the military capabilities that were needed for the mission. Our ships would be able to do this job very successfully, and they really wanted to prove that".

The final factor in participating in anti-piracy activities is that it is consistent with Denmark's view as an active member of the international community. Although Danish anti-piracy participation was first seen as a necessary means to protect maritime transport, it was also seen as an opportunity to support the internationalist agenda, especially on the UN track. The fight against Somali piracy has a clear United Nations mandate.

From the very beginning, it was an international alliance composed of a very wide range of voluntary countries and international organizations, including key security and political alliances such as NATO and the European Union.

A team of about 20 Royal Danish Air Force officers and men operate a CL-604 Challenger aircraft at an airfield in the Seychelles. The aircraft is equipped to conduct maritime surveillance operations and is often used by the Danes to monitor fishing areas near Greenland and monitor environmental pollution.

The crew flew along the coast of Somalia, verifying shipping activity, distinguishing between legitimate maritime traffic and suspected pirate ships, and in particular identifying possible piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Major Bjorn Moller, commander of the contingent, said: "NATO has been focusing on the Somali coast this time, and so far, no piracy has been detected. Although the crews were used to conduct similar operations in Denmark, But it's another thing to be part of a coalition to protect the shipping industry, especially the men and women who work on ships in Somali waters."

As a member of the NATO alliance, Denmark uses this capability to support international efforts to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa. Denmark has contributed many naval ships and reconnaissance aircraft to NATO efforts at various times since the early days of Operation Sea Shield. Denmark's efforts are part of a larger cooperative response that includes NATO members and partners from across the region. These missions are directed from Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, England.

On November 19, a detachment of 20 officers and soldiers of the Royal Danish Air Force took off from the Seychelles for the last time. The flight and the visit of NATO Commander Andreas Vitos marked the end of the sixth deployment of the Royal Danish Air Force Air Challenger CL-604 as part of NATO's Permanent Ocean Shield operation. The Danish contingent was NATO's last counter-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean. During the month-long tour, the unit completed 17 sorties or missions and recorded nearly 90 hours of flight time.

"The work the Danish contingent has done over the years to deter attacks and provide surveillance has been admirable and has helped improve the safety of seafarers in the region. It would have been worse without our presence in the region," Anders Major Peter said Cade, Commander.

The Danes' main task was to produce an intelligence map of Somalia's coastline, small camps and life patterns in large cities. The detachment covers 1,800 kilometers of coastline, where intelligence experts review and disseminate photo and video files to generate intelligence pictures.

As Operation Sea Shield prepares to end at the end of the year, the detachment shuts down outpost operations. Overall, the Danish Challenger fleet has completed more than 200 flights since 2011, totaling more than 1,100 hours patrolling the Somali coastline and the Indian Ocean.

3. THE INFLUENCE OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL SUPORT FOR THE OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD

More Somali Pirate Attacks Near the Horn of Africa More than 450 ships and nearly 2,400 hostages have been hijacked since 2007. The number of U.S.-flagged ships and ships is already pretentious among them. As Somalia lacks a functioning government, it cannot suppress piracy in its waters, so the National Security Council (NSC) in December 2008 developed an Inter-Agency Campaign to Combat Piracy in the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan, to prevent, cooperate in the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa with international and industry partners.

To achieve this goal, the plan outlines three "courses of action" for U.S. policy:

- 1) Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the oceans to pirates.
- 2) To combat piracy in accordance with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states.
- 3) Ensuring that those who commit piracy do so through advocacy to flag, victim, and coastal states and, where appropriate, that the United States prosecute suspected piracy and hold them accountable for their actions.

The United States has also provided strength and leadership to the Combined Maritime Forces. United Sea Power, an alliance of 25 contributor's countries committed to maritime security operations the area. In January 2009, the Maritime Joint Force was established Joint Task Force 151, a multinational naval task force, and the only mission to carry out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf Aden and the waters off the Somali coast of the Indian Ocean. That the previous role was played by Joint Task Force 150, of which continue to implement anti-terrorism and other maritime security operation since 2001. 11 countries have participated, and several others agree to send ships or aircrafts, or both participate in Joint Task Force 151. In addition, the United States has also contributed assets to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's anti-piracy efforts since its establishment inception. Its current effort, Operation Ocean Shield, focuses on anti-piracy operations at sea and provide assistance to the region countries develop their own anti-piracy capabilities activity. In addition, as part of the maritime joint force, The United States is also cooperating with the European Union, and the European Union conducts anti-piracy operations and ships escorting the World Food Program Provide humanitarian assistance to countries in the region, and independent deployers who are not part of the Escort Ship Alliance and patrol area waters.

The 2005 U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy declared that the United States has an important national interest in maritime security. The strategy recognizes that countries have a shared interest in promoting the economic security of a vibrant maritime trade and preventing maritime-related terrorist, hostile, criminal and dangerous acts, including piracy. A national maritime security strategy also requires comprehensive and complete national and international coordination, cooperation, and sharing of intelligence information between public and private entities to protect and ensure maritime security. The 2007 Policy Against Piracy and Other Violent Crimes at Sea states that it is U.S. policy to "continue to lead and support" international efforts to combat piracy, and urges other nations to act decisively, individually and through international efforts. "

But the attack success rate is still a percentage of the total the reported attack resulted in boarding or hijacking, it dropped from about 40% in 2008 to 22% in 2009. And international officials interpret this as a sign of effort shipping industry, government, and international navy Patrols to prevent or sabotage attacks are on the condition. In addition, in the first six months of 2010, the report stated the total number of attacks dropped from 149 to about 100 Attacks in the first half of 2009. However, other data shows Piracy is still a long-standing problem.

U.S. Navy and Coast Guard has made substantial progress, contributed assets and leadership Coalition forces patrolled the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. According to defense officials, there are usually more than 30 ships from Union, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and independent forces patrol the area at any time, The United States contributes 4 to 5 ships per day on average. In addition, according to the action plan, the U.S. military has Respond and successfully prevented the pirate attack. E.g, In April 2009, the US military successfully executed the hostages.

What happened when the pirates attacked the American flag MV Maersk Alabama and kidnapped the captain of the ship? U.S. Army Intervened after killing everyone but one of them and released the captain Pirates conducting attacks.

In April 2009, pirates hijacked MV Maersk Alabama and attacked MV Liberty Sun. The U.S.-flagged and crewed cargo ship was contracted by the World Food Program to deliver aid from AID to the southeastern coast of Somalia. On April 8, 2009, Somali pirates seized the US-flagged merchant vessel MV Maersk Alabama about 250 nautical miles southeast of the Somali town of Eyl. The Maersk Alabama has delivered food aid to the port of Djibouti and is on its way to the port of Mombasa in Kenya. It was hijacked by Somali pirates. After the ship was seized, a crew of 20 U.S. citizens chased after their Somali captives and tried unsuccessfully to rescue the captain and Vermont resident Richard Phillips, according to media reports.

In response, the U.S. Navy dispatched the U.S. Navy. Bainbridge, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and reconnaissance planes traveled to the area to monitor the small boat holding Captain Phillips. FBI personnel worked with Navy personnel to negotiate the release of the hostages. On April 11, after it was officially determined that Phillips' life was in danger, U.S. Special Forces launched a successful rescue operation under the authority of President Obama. Three pirates were killed by snipers during a rescue operation in the United States.

As international coordination of counter-piracy efforts at sea and in the region has improved in recent months, U.S. civilian and military officials have continued to stress the importance and difficulty of finding a solution to the instability off the coast of Somalia. The UN Security Council has committed \$72 million to AMISOM. The United States has provided AMISOM with more than \$135 million worth of training, logistical support and assistance over the past two years.

The US government provides small arms and ammunition to Transitional Federal Government (TFG) security forces through AMISOM partners, as well as funds to purchase weapons. According to U.S. officials, the United States has trained Transitional Federal Government security personnel and provided the Transitional Federal Government with funds to purchase weapons and ammunition. In mid-2009, the Government arranged for an "emergency" delivery of some 40 tons of small arms and ammunition to Transitional Federal Government forces in response to increasing enemy attacks. As of June 2009, U.S. officials said the total value of the program was less than \$10 million.

4. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DENMARK AND U.S. IN THE OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD

The implications of the two states, Denmark, and the U.S., took place during the entire 2009-2016 mission, each coming with its maritime contribution and not only that. The last attack was carried out by the Danish troops on 19.11.2016. During the period Denmark and the U.S. contributed to Operation Ocean Shield with the following ships:

Both the U.S. and Denmark had the common goal of bringing peace and stability to Somalia through political, military and humanitarian efforts.

The main reason why Denmark joined anti-piracy initiatives was the safety of Danish ships crossing the Indian Ocean as well as for international traffic. It also reflects the fact that Denmark-a small country with a large merchant fleet-is very interested in maintaining the safety of international sea lanes and is capable of making a meaningful contribution to this task.

It is well known that America is part of the three great military powers in the world, along with China and Russia.

Tabell. Participating forces

| Year | United States | Denmark |
|------|---|------------------------------------|
| 2009 | USS Donald Cook USS Boone | HDMS Absalon |
| 2010 | USS Cole USS Cole USS Kauffman USS Laboon | HDMS Esbern Snare |
| 2011 | USS Laboon USS De Wert USS Carney USS Carl Vinson USS Bunker Hill USS Enterprise | HDMS Esbern Snare |
| 2012 | USS Carney USS Dewert USS Taylor | HDMS Absalon HDMS IverHuitfeldt |
| 2013 | USS Nicholas USS Halyburton USS De Wert USS Taylor | HDMS EsbernSnare |
| 2014 | | HDMS EsbernSnare |
| 2015 | | HDMS Absalon |
| 2016 | | DNK MPA P520/P524 |

The maritime, air, political, strategic support of the U.S. as well as the implications in alliances to combat piracy are incomparable to the support brought by Denmark, for the simple reason that the U.S. is much better prepared and equipped with armaments. America has made an important contribution of weapons to equip and defend the military. Denmark was involved in helping the surrounding countries with food and humanitarian support, the U.S. as far as we know was not involved in such special operations but provided support where needed.

Denmark became involved in the operation in Somalia because of the negative effect that piracy had on the country's economy, because of the imports and exports that were affected because pirates attacked ships that were cracking along the Indian Ocean carrying goods.

One of the common reasons for the U.S. and Denmark is the promotion of multilateralism. Denmark wanted to defend her economy still had another purpose, which was to protect the economy of the countries with which they related. The U.S. has still offered its involvement to protect the economies of NATO countries. Thus, both countries support both the personal interests and the interests of NATO countries. The U.S. has been involved in many tactics and alliances against piracy in Somalia through strategic and political support. Both the U.S. and Denmark protected NATO's interests throughout the mission and emerged as member countries. Both countries were attacked during the operation by pirates and suffered human losses.

5. CONCLUSION

Pirates have always existed since humans traveled to sea. In the past decade, piracy off the coast of Somalia has posed a serious threat to Danish and American shipping and the safety of seafarers.

Although eradicating piracy may never happen, minimizing piracy and reducing its impact remains an important priority for the United States and Denmark. This includes not only Somali piracy, but also other forms of maritime crime, such as drug smuggling in the Indian Ocean and human trafficking in the Mediterranean. In order to minimize and mitigate the impact of maritime crime, there is no one-size-fits-all option. The legal framework, political conditions, and operational possibilities for specific areas of (cooperation) piracy and other maritime crimes vary.

Since the end of the NATO Ocean Shield operation, two ships have been hijacked within two weeks, close to the coast of Somalia—a development that has raised questions about the success of the mission. The mission is part of a highly successful coordinated international response to the threat of pirates off the coast of Somalia, which caused US\$7 billion in economic losses and many casualties at its peak, but it seems that the war against piracy in the region is far from over. The mission was praised as a success and helped to significantly reduce the number of accidents in the area. Between May 2012 and the end of the operation in December 2016, no merchant ships were captured in the area.

As a member of the NATO alliance, Denmark uses this capability to support the international community's fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa. From the early days of Operation Sea Shield, Denmark has contributed a number of naval ships and reconnaissance aircraft to NATO efforts at various times. Denmark's efforts are part of a larger cooperative response that includes NATO members and partners from across the region.

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