

TERRORISM AS A RISK AND A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY. PRESENTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR WAYS OF OPERATING ON ROMANIA'S TERRITORY

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***Abstract:** The democratic society will always be aware that terrorism, in all of its forms, posts a major threat to national security, to human security and to individual freedoms, anywhere in the world. The states will have to condemn the oppression and the discrimination of which the ethnical and religious minorities fall victims, to ask the Parliaments to adopt laws which can guarantee the rights of the minorities, to identify all the acts of oppression and discrimination against them and to establish penalties against those who makes them. Knowing the multidimensional nature of the human security and being aware that the understanding of the human security must be dynamic and flexible, in order to respond to the numerous challenges regarding this matter that occur relating to Romania and its allies, it will lead to an universal consent.*

***Keywords:** terrorism, national security, terrorist organization.*

1. TERRORISM AS A RISK AND A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

In the situation in which at the beginning of the 21st century we became the citizens of a new millenia, marked by many changes and risks, what had been considered until now impossible and terrifying scenarios for the humanity became a terrifying reality and a danger more and more obvious and present. *Hitting the present, spreading the evil and pretending to offer a better future* (Marret, 2002) the terrorism got at this beginning of century and millenia, through the magnitude and the diversity of its forms of manifestation, an complex character, extended to the scale of the whole world.

The challenges are not any more conflicts between states, they are of a nature much more complex, belonging not only once to the zone of organized crime, terrorism, economical instability and not last to the threats to the environment. In this context it can be considered that we are facing new threats, aggressive and unpredictable as potential, power of destruction, resources, global

network like spreading, goals and targets. According to EUROJUST statistics a number of 706 individuals have been arrested in 15 of the countries member of the E.U. being suspected of felonies that are on the line between organized crime and terrorism.

The new types of risks- diffuse, hard to locate and practically impossible to fight against with modern traditional means- require a new intergrated approach, which should combine the political, economical and financial instruments with a strategy regarding the usage of new technologies destined to counterfight the phenomenon in its whole.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It had in contemporaneity an unprecedented growth and, through the new means of manifestation, through its more and more organized character, distinctive danger and the obvious internationalization, it represents a lasting threat to human community, to institutions and even to countries.

It has to be remembered although the fact that terrorism in Europe has at its foundations the historical, political, economical and social luggage of every state member of the E.U.

Starting from this point of knowledge, it can't be neglected neither the fact that European Union, as a political institution, is more and more identified as a symbol, involving the risk to become a target for terrorism.

Relating, in a sequential analysis, to *islamic terrorism*, the terrorism in E.U., and in Romania, has to be approached from a global perspective of the international security environment. This is the more imposed by the fact that terrorist organizations which make propaganda in auxiliary states have used and use E.U. as a base of recruiting new members, Al-Qaida being more than an example.

Funding of terrorism covers, according to some open information sources (TE SAT 2007) two distinct domains marked by the funding of the terrorist attacks and the funding of terrorist networks.

The funds are obtained through the creation and the management of small companies, as sources of legal income, which this way are used for the support of the terrorist groups inside and outside E.U.

According to those presented here, another important source is obtained from the private donations and the unproper usage of the "AKAT" meaning, "the third part of the income which has to be given by the Muslims to the poor and unhelpful". In the situations in which the string of illegal sources for the funding of terrorism covers, for the biggest part, the majority of the criminal actions, from the technique related to falsifying identity and travelling documents, to felonies of financial nature, as the usage of false credit cards, the evaluation of the total sum of the illegal incomes used to fund the terrorism is almost impossible.

In our opinion, Europe constitutes for terrorism, an authentic *theatre of action* which starts in the Urals and spreads to the Atlantic, the central-European region being particularly exposed to this attack, because of geographical and political reasons. It is a sad reality that the majority of the leaders of the terrorist organizations can cross almost unhindered the borders, that enormous sums of money can travel from one continent to another in a matter of hours, however when it is about those who

apply the law, paradoxical, the borders become a serious obstacle.

Otherwise, from the reports and the international conferences (*The Conference of Ministers from Justice Departments, Moscow, 4-5 oct 2006*) results undoubtedly "that the concern raised by the terrorism can't be solved solely through individual actions being necessary the usage, especially, of the means offered by the international criminal law". In the situations where national laws and strategies fail to keep up to the trends of the transnational crime and its high technologies it becomes more and more obvious the fact that national security and applying the law must become inseparable notions.

In the E.U. terrorism and organized crime are in essence transnational phenomena. As we related before, the year 2006 was marked by an amplification of the manifestations of the terrorist phenomenon. The separatist terrorists have deployed no less than 424 terrorist attacks in the European zones. The Group ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*) had claimed a number of 11 attacks in Spain, while the IRRINTZI movement had claimed the responsibility of 4 attacks in France. A number of 6 attacks, deployed in Madrid and Barcelona, has been claimed by GRAPO (*First of October Antifascist Resistance Group*). In this context, we have clues (TE SAT 2007) and about the fact that half of the 282 attacks registered in 2006 in Corsica have been claimed by the *Front Liberation Nationale de la Corse* (FLNC) and *Union des Combattants* (UDC) groups, these two having exact information about their targets.

Italy knew a growth of the number of attacks from the anarchist and the left wing groups like BR-PCC (*Brigate Rosse per la Costituzione del Partito Comunista Combattente*) and FAI (*Federazione Anarchica Informale*), responsible for one, respective 9 attacks in Rome, but also in other cities from the northern part of the country and from Toscana.

Without having the intention to dwell about the manifestations of the terrorism, we have to reiterate the fact that the possibilities to counterfight it require a sustained exchange of intelligence and a permanent cooperation

among the specialized structures in the antiterrorist retort, either that we stand with those external like: GSG - 9 (*The Antiterrorist German Commando*), SEK (*Spezialeinsatz Kommando*), SAS (*Special Air Service*), GIGN (*The Intervention Group of the French Jendarmerie*), OSASTO KARHU - Helsinki („The BEAR” Unit) sau GIS (*Groupe Italian Interventional Speciale*), NOCS (*Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza*), GEO (*Grupo Especial Espagnol de Operaciones*), or that we remember, not last, the specialized internal units like: „Vlad Tepes” Brigade or „ACVILA” from Ministry of Administration and Interior, „B-AT” from Romanian Intelligence Service or „the Special Intervention Unit” from The Protection and Guard Service.

The exchange of intelligence, with the goal of preventing and counterfighting the terrorism, is imposed so much more while, until present days, in Romania, the phenomenon of terror has not manifested to the magnitude and amplitude found in the western countries (Germany, Denmark and, repeatedly, in Great Britain) and neither have not grown distinctive criminal organizations like YAKUZA (Japan), KASTAFARIS (Jamaica) or like the Chinese Triads.

There are registered, though, a series of proper and even stimulent social and economical factors for the internal organized crime, beeing manifested obvious tendencies of swift joining of it to the process of globalization and internationalization of the present criminal organizations in the majority of the world states.

The development of the organized crime in Romania could be interpreted, lato senso, from the perspective offered by the democratization process and, by default, by the intregation in the world economical circuit. Also, „the opening of the borders, doubled by an relaxed customs control” has given an impulse, to unprecedented heights, to the movement of people and goods, to illegal imigration, grand theft auto, traffic with false currency, traffic with radioactive materials, traffic with art work, and, not last, to the economical and financial crime and that wich uses fizical aggresion.

While the specialists fail to get to an consent in the definition of the concept of terrorism, organized crime (*Ad-Hoc Group for Organized Crime of E.U.*, 2005), mafia or corruption, that can be defined from different angles and experiences, the structures of the organized crime prove more and more that they can adapt easely to the changes of the situations and conditions (INTERPOL, 13-14 december 2005), heading swiftly to economical spaces wich offers them the biggest income and obvious possibilities to penetrate social and juridical institutions.

Far from beeing considered only a banal joining of two or more felons to brake into homes or grand theft auto and selling the stealed goods, the organized crime, unlike the terrorist organizations, has objectives established for a long time, in the economical, political, and social area and have the goal to aquire profil and power. In the terrorism tends to change a political system, the groups of the organized crime folow only continuous incomes.

In this manner, reported to the terrorist fenomenon, Europe confronts its self with an amplification of the crime actions like: counterfeit, false currency, illegal traffic with drugs, arms, munitions, explosives, false coins and persons traffic. In this context significant are the actions deployed by the members of the nowadays KADEK (detached from PKK- The Workers Party from Kurdistan) in the domain of drug trafficking and by PKK in the domain of arms, munitions and explosives trafficking and also the traffic of persons.

What Romania concerns, the existence of such structures that are part of international terrorist organizations is most highlighted by specialized sources (www.sri.ro), among the major threats to national security. Organizations like: The Front for Liberation of Palestine, Muslim Brothers(FM), ABU NIDAL, HEZBOLLAH, HAMAS, HIZB-AL TAHRIR (*The Party of Islamic Liberation*) or the GIA (*The Armed Islamic Group*) and not last.

The Gray Wolves have, through their nucleus of representation, an virtually real potential of affirmation, beeing instructed to „adopt reserved positions that should not attract

retorts from the authorities of the Romanian state" (Antipa, 2004).

Although until nowadays, at least in the terrorist area, have not been highlighted important connections between the big structures of the international organized crime, the most representative remaining the Italian MAFIA, on one side, and the terrorist groups or organizations, on the other side, the distinctive danger posed by the crime actions deployed by the international organized crime on Romania's territory made of this the object of investigations from the institutions which have this jurisdiction.

This way, it can be estimated that, to the distinctive threats posed by the terrorism and the organized crime to European security, where subscribes national security too, adds up new risk factors, resulted from the interface of the two phenomena and represented by:

1. financial means obtained by the terrorist groups from activities of organized crime, these allowing the development of their own management and operational capabilities;

2. generation of interests conflicts, by implying terrorism in organized crime, which can be solved through means of an extreme degree of violence;

3. amplifying an concern status regarding the perspective of installing and consolidating, on national territory, of structures linked to organized crime, related with the revival of the international terrorist phenomenon.

Starting from those here presented it can be estimated that the criminal and terrorist organizations converge multiple characteristics that allows them a close cooperation and that this allows the existence of a high structural hierarchy, with decisional domains, with objectives and competences well defined. In the same time, in the deployment of the peculiar activities, these use official covers, being targeted illegal activities of great amplitude, the violence being the main rule of action.

With the intent of supporting a better knowledge of the phenomenon of terrorism and transnational organized crime we appreciate that Al-Qaida represents *the quintessence* of these manifestations.

To be remembered is also the fact that the symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime influences, obviously, the world economy too. Thus, the evolution of the capital and bourse market have become unpredictable, with negative impact on the economy of the developing states or of the young democracies from Central and Eastern Europe.

On this background the security strategies must be fundamentally rethought, taking into account the inclusion of new vectors in the *national security equation* of each state. In the context where the continental and world forums channel their efforts in the direction of identifying the adequate solutions to eradicate the terrorist phenomenon, Romania has amplified its efforts to counterfight this scourge, in international domains and in internal ones. These efforts have as target the joining of Romania in the international coalition, with the objective of counterfighting the terrorism, using all the national potential at disposal and intensifying the measures of updating the laws and the installation of the community's *acquis*.

Starting with 9/11, at the level of Ministry of Administration and Interior have been triggered a series of organized actions, distinctive, which had the objective the prevention and counterfighting the transnational terrorism. As a part of The National System for Prevention and Counterfighting the Terrorism (SNPCT), the Ministry of Administration and Interior has taken concrete measures to stiffen the surveillance and the security of the borders, to make more effective the security, guard and order systems, in the area of embassies, legations, foreign representations, and to the head-quarters of the local and central administrations.

During the applied procedures the Ministry of Administration and Interior has given priority to counterfight the traffic of persons and the illegal immigration, on one side, and to identify the leaders of those structures, respective the specialized guides in the illegal crossing of borders, on the other side. According totally to the dispositions of the *community's acquis* Romania remains an

active and effective member in the fight to prevent and to counterfight any type of risks and threats related or directly linked to terrorism.

2. PRESENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND OF THE MEANS OF ACTION ON ROMANIA'S TERRITORY

„La Depeche Intemationale des Drogues” (DIG), one of the publications of „Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues” (OGD), at the chapter Romania, analyzing the situation of drugs between the years 1995 - 1996 demonstrates that Romania, mostly between 1992 - 2005 has tranformed from a transit state in a country with a small start in producing drugs and a big consumption, mostly of heroin. There are shown three main causes of this catastrophic status: chaos in the domain of laws, corruption found at the highest levels and the tolerance in Romania of the mafia and crime organizations, known by their involvment in drug trafficking, where can be found guilty the authorities that where between 1992 - 1996. A first trend is that the drug traffickers don't limit them selfs only to transiting the drugs on Romania's teritory and selling them in Hungary.

The constitution of important stocks of drugs allows an redistribution, in the direction of the Schengen area, via Poland and Cech Republik. In only four yrears (1992 - 1996) the quantities of drugs stored in Romania - having one of the newest sources in Caucaz, with the transit of ucrainian and russian ports - have grown considerably. Almost 6 tonnes of drugs have been confiscated in 1996, mostly compounds of canabis, but also 180 kg of cocain and 62 kg of heroin, confiscated at the border by the hungarian customs officers, after it had crossed romanina border. The hasis from Romania came from the Golden Horn of Eastern Africa, marijuana from Nigeria, cocain from Colombia, Venezuela and Brasil. That's why it is considered that Romania of the years 1992 - 1996 transformed into an authentical casting plate of internationad high risc drugs traffic.

In 1997 Romania doesn't play only the role of an terestrial, aerial and naval transit of the drugs coming from South-East Asia, Turkey, Latin America and Africa. The new role of the country in drug traffic, most that of heroin, has been highlighted by more factors. The narcoactivities have exploited, after the falling of the communist regime, the disorder, an inadequate law, economical crysis and large scale corruption. The presence in Romania of a turkish minority and of the kurdish, iranian, albanian, chinese immigrants have favoured the traffic of this kind. Romania became an important base for the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK), organization wich is in war with the turkish goverment. Thus, alost side corruption, inadequate laws, disorder, the regime favoured the high risc drug traffic through the continuation of the links with a series of terrorist organizations (like PKK), well known for their involvment in drug traffic. We must observe that at this chapter it hasn't been anythig else done then to continue the well known link of the regime with terrorism. The Report of OGD for 1997 considers that „it is too early to know if the attempt to moralise the public life, taken by the new goverment, ellected in november 1996, will have durable effects”.

„*Reports of RIS*”- 60% of the drugs wich came into Romania, between 1992 – 1996 came from Tukey. The most important capture, heroin(42 kg), has been made in 12 december 1996, in a bus property of the turkish company „Toros”. The drug was stored in small packages, of 500 grammes. Usually, after they introduced the drugs in Romania, the turkish citizens used citizens from other countries as carriers. From 95 traffiker arreted in Bucharest in 1996, 41 proved to be iranians, 20 romanians and 14 turkish. The heroin that came from Afganistan and from the countrie of Central Asia, enteredn in Romania via Moldova and Ukraine. Untill 1995 this drug was swiftly send via Hungary and Slovakia to the countrie in Western Europe: mainly to Austria, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Holland.

A part of the traffic deployed in Romania was is the hands of the kurds, from wich the most were members of the terrorist organization PKK. The Workers Party of

Kurdistan, PKK, was hiding behind an mass organization generically named „The Front for the Liberation of Kurds” (originally, ERNK), which grouped different women, youth, students and businessmen organizations from Romania. About the kurdish businessmen, for example, it is known that they have been grouped in „The Association of the Businessmen from the East”. There are some reports that confirm that this „association” was „an excellent link for the activities of the PKK”. All the kurdish organizations from Romania in 1996 were under a strict control of PKK, and the leader was, in the same time, the leader of the front ERNK too. The direct responsible for the collecting of the income was the one and the same person with the delegate for the propaganda problems of the PKK and, in the same time, the director of the kurdish newspaper in Romania named „The Voice of Mesopotamia”.

Newspaper which was distributed unhindered, free, at the entrances of the Bucharest’s Metro lines. We specify that this director was a prosper businessman, which followed english literature courses at Oxford. Almost 90% from the kurds from Romania were members of organizations which were part of the ERNK and paid dues, in this way, to PKK. Important detail: 75% from these small oriental investors from Romania were of turkish nationality, but in reality, they were kurds and ERNK gave to their disposition the initial income to start their small businesses, observes OGD/97.

According to the statistics of the Romanian Police, almost 65% from the total of the captures made at customs were from transport companies. The spokesmen from PKK and ERNK not only have denied that their organizations are involved in drug trafficking, but also have specified that, in fact, they collaborated with the Romanian Police (the antidrug services have been constituted in Romania after the 90’s), four of the captures being made on the base of the information given by the kurdish organizations. Anyway, not even one kurdish citizen was ever involved.

According to OGD, the collaboration of PKK and ERNK with the police, was nothing

else than an intelligent way to eliminate the competition from the drugs market, with the help of the Romanian Police.

The position of the Romanian Police, which has appreciated this kind of collaboration remains anyway vague, it is specified in the report 00D197. The spokesman of RIS, had declared that the Romanian Intelligence Service detained clear information regarding the involvement of kurds in drugs and arms traffic, but could not make them public. It is remarkable that, although RIS knew perfectly what the organizations PKK and ERNK were doing in Romania, the regime had ignored the intell and preferred to continue the hidden cooperation with the kurds. It is easy to suppose why: hidden funds were at the disposal of the governing party and for their political clients.

The kurds were involved in the illegal traffic that was transiting from Turkey to Romania, via Bulgaria, and in that which was transiting Ukraine from Moldova, coming from the russian space. According to the Romanian Police „the drug that comes to us from the countries of the former USSR is under the control of the russian, caucasian and ukrainian mafia”. PKK had links with all these mafia. The links of the kurds were favoured by the fact their organizations are legal. In Russia they even have official representatives. A living symbol of the cooperation between the postcommunist regime and the kurds and the russian mafia continues the illegal affairs. In september 1995 the turkish police arrested at Edime a romanian, along with other six kurds („turkish citizens”), which were transporting 2kg of heroin, 5 guns and a assault rifle.

The romanian had declared at the interrogatory that he is at the eighth transport of heroin to Romania and of explosives to outside Romania. The romanian confessed that he was working for PKK. According to some confidential reports, sources close to Romanian Secret Services have uncovered that the arrested romanian was one of their men and that he was also working for the transnistrian mafia. An officer of the 14th Russian Army declared to an OGD correspondent, that in 1995, „the russian troops favoured the commerce with drugs

coming from Extreme Orient". According to the officer the drug traffic in the area was leaded by an russian jew wich had swiss citizenship, an individual from the anturaje of president Snegur.

This jew was the object of an arrest warrant in Russia for trafficking industrial diamond and arms. It is about the well known gangster Boris Birnstein wich had in Moldova almost monopoly of the export of brute materials (like wood), the monopoly on banks, on asurance companies, thru his big company named „Seabeco” the one who was controlling the imprint of the money in Moldova too. Along side with the monopoly of making passports, „Seabeco” controlled also the turism and became, in the mean time, the owner of the luxury hotel MOLDOVA from Chisinau, including the casino from the hotel, both property of KGB untill 1991. „Seabeco” was the owner in Moldova, in 1996, of 12 farms, wich produced 3500 tonnes of turkey meat for the western market, along side with the monopoly of drug traffic and stolen cars from Germany and Austria. One of hose cars was given as a gift from Birnstein to the ministry of Justice of Moldova, with wich he was caught in Vienna in 1992.

The car was in fact stolen by the ukrainean mafia in the city of Heilbron (Germany). The minister was only a courier for Birnstein, wich leaded affairs with persons trafficking too, where he has using moldavian girls for the hotels from Germany. In reallity Birnstein and Seabeco were in fact washing money for the russian mafia, money wich then were deposited „clean” in the banks in Switzerland. Who was in fact Birnstein? According to FBI and Interpol Birnstein immigrated from Russia to Israel in the 80's, reimmigrated wih a canadian passport so that, in 1991, using his old russian passport to come into Moldova where he obtained a moldavian passport. He lured Mircea Snegur with a large amount of gasoline, wich he then sold, in Snegur's name, to an much better price in Sweden and Finnland, dividing afterwards the profit with Snegur. Immediately, Birnstein obtained the first monopolies in Moldova: the making of driving licences and the import and export of gasoline. At the ellections in 1996 Birnstain

funded the campaign of Snegur forcing thus him not to be involvled into the liberation of the Ilascu group, wich the gangester considers to be nationalist.

Significantly, in 1992, Birnstein was the intermediate of the crisyys wich led to the separation of Transnistria, region where one of the most important ballistical rockets arsenal can be found, according to the american services. Birnstein managed then to debark gen. Lebed, after he got his hands on a cassette where Lebed considers Eltin „drunken pig” and transmitted it to Kremlin. We stray on Boris Birnstein because his trusted link in Romania - in the years after the Revolution from 1989 - was the well known Vitali Ustroi(Usturoi), invoved in several affairs of traffic with strategic materials.

It should be remembered the affair with red mercury, from the parking lot at Vila-Lac Snagov, where were involved some officers from the Army. In the same report OGD/97 („La Depeche Intemationale des Drogues” (DIG), one of the publications of „Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues” (OGD) is mentioned the drug traffic in wich was involved the italian mafia „Sacra Corona Unita”. This organization controlled the drug traffic between Italy and Romania, mainly of heroin, brought from Turkey, and of cocain, brought from Brasil.

„Sacra Corona Unita” enjoyed, according to OGD/97 the complicity of some high clerks and from the police of the regime. The report OGD/97 notes: „The Parquet admitted for the first time that in Romania, the organized crime and the drug traffic enjoyed political support and that the „dirty money” were used by „some parties” to „fund the ellection campaigns”.

At the end, the OGD/97 report states, black on white, that still exists the problem requiring to uncover „the links of the old afterrevolutionary goverment with the organized crime”.

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